Episode 130
VENEZUELA: The US on Venezuela’s Oil & more – 15th Jan 2026
Diplomats testing the waters on reopening channels, the U.S reshaping the legal and commercial plumbing around Venezuela’s oil money, the bolívar sliding, prisoner releases, Colombia watching the ELN across the border, and much more!
Thanks for tuning in!
Let us know what you think and what we can improve on by emailing us at info@rorshok.com
Like what you hear? Subscribe, share, and tell your buds.
"Big Oil Knows That Trump’s Venezuela Plans Are Delusional” by Rogé Karma: https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/2026/01/trump-plan-venezuela-oil-economic-mistake/685572/
Check out our new t-shirts: https://rorshok.store/
We want to get to know you! Please fill in this mini-survey: https://forms.gle/NV3h5jN13cRDp2r66
Wanna avoid ads and help us financially? Follow the link: https://bit.ly/rorshok-donate
Transcript
Buenos días from Gracia! This is the Rorshok Venezuela Update from the 15th of January twenty twenty-six. A quick summary of what's going down in Venezuela.
When diplomats start checking the locks on an embassy, it’s usually because somebody wants back in the room. On Friday the 9th, the United States and Venezuela said they were exploring steps toward restoring diplomatic relations, after a U.S. delegation visited Venezuela to assess what a phased return could even look like. In practice, that means basic questions first: security, staffing, and whether the two governments can build a channel that isn’t just shouting through press releases.
Also on Friday the 9th, President Donald Trump met oil executives at the White House and pushed them to invest in Venezuela’s energy sector. The gap here is trust: companies want stable rules and legal protection, while the US wants speed and leverage. The meeting made one thing obvious—this is no longer a hypothetical what if sanctions change? conversation. It’s an okay, who’s willing to sign something? conversation.
Now, here’s the kind of story that sounds like paperwork until you realize it decides who gets paid. On Friday the 9th, the White House published an executive order aimed at protecting Venezuelan oil revenue held in U.S.-controlled accounts from being seized by creditors. Translation: if the US wants oil money to fund services in Venezuela—or to be used as political leverage—then it can’t be instantly vacuumed up by lawsuits tied to old expropriations and unpaid claims.
Meanwhile, the first players to move weren’t the biggest names in U.S. oil—they were the fast, flexible middlemen. On Monday the 12th, Reuters reported that trading houses Vitol and Trafigura beat U.S. oil majors to the first deals to export Venezuelan crude, as part of a plan the US says could unlock around two billion dollars worth of oil tied to roughly fifty million barrels. Traders are built for messy logistics. Big oil companies—especially public ones—tend to hesitate when the legal and security risks look like quicksand.
But here’s the point that often gets lost in the U.S. hype: the people who actually run the industry inside Venezuela are listening too. On Thursday the 8th, PDVSA said negotiations with the U.S. were progressing, but Wills Rangel, a PDVSA board member and union leader, stressed that the U.S. would have to pay international prices—pushing back on the idea that Venezuela’s crude is basically a prize to be controlled. Even in a week dominated by foreign policy, that’s a domestic signal: the oil industry still sees itself as a national asset, not an annex.
Now, let’s talk about the thing people have to deal with first: prices. On Friday the 9th, the Financial Times reported the bolívar fell by close to twenty percent on the street market, widening the gap between the official rate and what people actually pay. That gap hits small businesses immediately: suppliers quote dollars, customers pay bolívares, and suddenly everything becomes mental math.
You also see it on the street. Reporters from Caracas described people stocking up, some stores closing early, and queues forming for basics—not always because shelves were empty, but because uncertainty makes everyone try to buy tomorrow’s peace of mind today.
Uncertainty isn’t only economic this week. It’s physical too. On Saturday the 10th, the U.S. Embassy in Venezuela posted a security alert telling U.S. citizens not to travel and urging those in the country to depart, citing reports of armed pro-government groups, often referred to as colectivos, setting up roadblocks and searching vehicles. Venezuela’s interim authorities dismissed the warning, but the effect is real either way—alerts like this change airline behavior, insurance decisions, and people’s willingness to travel between cities.
Meanwhile, on Monday the 12th, Reuters reported that the rights group Foro Penal said forty-one prisoners had been released, including two dozen overnight. Families outside prisons were doing what they’ve done for years: waiting, scrolling, and trying to confirm names through whispers before anything official lands.
But later that same day, the government put out a much bigger figure. Venezuela’s Ministry of Penitentiary Services said it released one hundred sixteen prisoners in the past few hours.
The mismatch doesn’t automatically mean someone is lying — it can be different time windows, different categories, different definitions of released.
Politically, though, dueling tallies turn into a credibility contest, and that contest shapes whether families trust what they hear next.
On Sunday the 11th, Venezuelans across Latin America watched events back home with caution, not a rush to return.
After the capture of Nicolás Maduro, officials in several countries encouraged people to go back. But many migrants said “not yet,” pointing to insecurity, weak public services, and the fact that much of the state apparatus still looks the same.
The Venezuelan diaspora — over eight million people — is now a political factor across the region, not just a humanitarian one.
While people abroad weigh whether home is safe, the borderlands keep moving on their own logic.
Now for the geopolitical ripple that Venezuelans absolutely notice, even if it’s happening at sea. On Monday the 12th, Reuters reported two China-flagged supertankers that were heading to Venezuela to pick up oil turned around, signaling that direct flows to China may not restart quickly. China has been Venezuela’s biggest oil customer, and a major creditor, so when tankers reverse course, it’s not just shipping gossip—it’s leverage moving in real time.
On Saturday the 10th, The Atlantic published an essay in English by Rogé Karma arguing that Trump’s “Venezuela oil comeback” pitch is basically delusional in the short term—not because Venezuela lacks oil, but because rebuilding output at scale takes time, capital, and legal stability that investors can trust. Karma’s point is that the administration talks like oil production is a faucet, but Venezuela’s industry has aging infrastructure, operational constraints, and a history of contract risk that makes big companies hesitate.
The essay also makes a U.S.-side argument: even if Venezuelan production rises, it’s unlikely to translate into cheaper gasoline or a clear win for U.S. consumers, because global prices depend on much bigger supply and demand forces. In other words, the political story is we’ll control the oil, but the market story is oil doesn’t care about your press conference.
Wanna read the full piece? Link in the show notes
Back to the international lane for a second. On Monday the 12th, Colombia’s guerrillas called for a national agreement.
The National Liberation Army of Colombia or ELN framed its message as a push to lower political conflict in Colombia, but the timing looked defensive: reports and statements suggested Colombia and the U.S. were exploring ways to hit ELN rear bases across the border in Venezuela. For Venezuelans near the frontier, that’s not abstract geopolitics—it can mean displacement, tighter controls, and armed actors competing for territory.
When conflict spills across borders, the next battlefield is legitimacy — and that’s where the Vatican comes in. On Monday the 12th, Reuters reported Pope Leo met opposition politician María Corina Machado at the Vatican and emphasized Venezuela’s sovereignty and human rights. Symbolically, this matters because Vatican attention raises the reputational cost of abuses and keeps detainees in the conversation—not just oil contracts and diplomatic chess.
And yes, the next headline is already queued up. Also on Monday the 12th, Reuters reported Trump is scheduled to meet Machado on Thursday. The meeting can be read as pressure, coordination, or bargaining—especially with oil revenue and sanctions relief hovering over every conversation like a third person at the table.
And to wrap up, a pop-culture note that fits this week a little too well. On Thursday the 8th, Rolling Stone reported a remix built around Maduro’s No War, Yes Peace slogan went viral, pushed by Dominican YouTuber Hey Santana. When headlines are about power, money, and people getting released from prison, a meme soundtrack can spread the story faster than any briefing. But it can also flatten the story into a soundbite. Humor is a pressure valve, but it’s also a blender.
Aaand that’s it for this week! Thank you for joining us!
Quick question, is there a specific monopoly in Venezuela you think is a big problem? Let us know at info@rorshok.com
¡Hasta la próxima!
